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Written
by Daud Ed
Sunday, 16 March 2008
The suppression of the free press and civil society and the
unconventional approach to state reconstruction in Somalia.
"One should not pretend that models for a harmonious
world order are ready at hand, and it would be equally disingenuous
to suppose that ideas of peace and community have much of
a chance when power is moved to action by aggressive perceptions
of 'vital national interests' or unlimited sovereignty."
Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 1993, p. 20
During the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, the United Nations
Security Council the Western diplomats, and some commentators
were discussing the urgency of salvage the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), as if it is a government of national unity
and failing to do so will have negative consequence for Somali
populace, and the security of the Greater Horn of Africa.
The UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1725 which lifted the arms
embargo, and made possible the Ethiopian invasion and other
African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces to assist Somalia's
TFG. The argument I was making in my articles and spent a
lot of time discussing with like-minded friends and others
who apposed, and irritated to hear my point of view was that,
how come the UN Security Council would allow such an act -
the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia - and the very idea of giving
unpopular, and illegitimate TFG unconditional support without
strings attached, which to me, was a blank check for destabilization,
and undoing everything that Somalis achieved for the last
ten years.
The failure
of UN Security Council and other International Contact Groups
(ICG) on Somalia is unjustified; they had the commitment,
the willingness, the financial resources, and the information
necessary to make a rational intervention. However, the UN
and ICG for same reason made a wrong choice relying Ethiopian
invasion, and bolstering a government run by warlords, incompetent
politicians, and self-appointed clan leaders, who are un-able
to gain the legitimacy, and consensus building necessary to
create government of nation unity. In the context of Somali
politics at the end of 2006 rational/realistic intervention
would mean building TFG's capacity through national reconciliation,
and condition any future funds by meeting performance goals,
as well as demanding a credible leaders, and competent bureaucracy
that are able to meet the challenge of reconstructing a modern
state from zero. While pressuring the opposing parties to
come to the table, because military intervention, especially
one led by the Ethiopia's autocratic Prime Minister in a post-9/11
environment is a recipe for disaster. The Southern and Central
Somalia, which has been the most unstable area was undergoing
a major political transformation or what I described a paradigm
shift a shift from zero sum politics, dominated by
view criminal warlords and their militias, to a politics of
hope and integrity, with its defining feature of predictability
and credibility which as been missing in Somali politics since
the independence in 1960, led by Union UIC, business groups,
and other local civil society organizations.
However,
in retrospect the influence of the extremist elements in UIC
were insignificant and were part of what Professor Michael
A. Weinstein rightly calls "revolutionary cycle,"
given UIC's acceptance of TFG as de facto government of Somalia
in first Khartoum meeting; their cooperation with the European
Union (EU) representatives and other diplomats; as well as
their education policy that did not prevent girls attend schools,
but encouraged; and when Sheikh Sharif who was the head of
the executive branch of UIC gave speech at one of the Mogadishu
secondary schools, some of the audience who were asking the
critical questions were girls who attended this school. Furthermore,
the media, civil society groups, and business had a stable
environment to perform their important function in society
without any restrictions. In addition, crime was all time
low since the collapse of Somali state; the price of weapons
and other ammunitions fall more than half; the value of Somali
shilling was gaining its lost value.
The pretext
for the Ethiopian invasion was not to stabilize Somalia, but
to prevent UIC becoming a unifying force that could pose unsubstantiated
threat to Ethiopia's national security interest, with the
cost of Somalia's stability. It was the then-chairman of the
African Union (AU) Alpha Omar Konare who commended the invasion
by saying; Ethiopia has a right to defend its national security
interest. However, Mele Zenawi's meddling in Somali politics
predates the formation of UIC. He had engaged a proxy war
to sabotage every political initiative and realignment to
revive and jump start Somalia's collapsed state, such as Transitional
National Government (TNG) - a product of a two year long peace
process hosted by the Djibouti government, and included different
stake holders, including warlords, civil society groups, clan
leaders, womens groups, Islamists intellectuals, and
expatriates the creativity, the hard work, and the
compromise that goes into this peace process was possible,
because the warlords were in steep decline, and impotent to
pose a major threat to any peace deal that bring together
various interests groups, and civil society organizations.
The biggest misconception of some political analysts in Somali
politics is that they consider Somali conflict as pure clan
competition, and the warlords as clan leaders that enjoy the
support of their sub clans.
However,
the warlords are the product of the civil war, and proliferated
after the disintegration of clan unity to provide security
for the members of their sub-clans, and to contain the warlords
of other clans. In other words, they were notorious entrepreneurs,
who managed to win the support of their sub-clans, while financing
their activities through various check-points that stalled
the clan's economic activity. As result, the clan's discontent
of the warlords, left no other option, but to shift their
loyalty to business elites, who provided employment for fellow
clan members and granted security through business partners
from other clans. In other words, the warlords and business
elites who belonged the same sub-clans, had a different priorities
and agendas.
The warlord's
power and influence increase with instability, and chaos,
and their mission is to create an environment that is receptive
to their activity. On the other hand, business elites prosper
through stable environment, and were eager to exploit the
untapped social capital - honesty, trust, predictability,
and multi-clan business enterprises to improve security and
expand market for their goods and services. Therefore their
mission contributes towards improving security, and in the
end genuine national reconciliation, and state reconstruction.
Furthermore, the main reason some political commentators and
experts misdiagnose the protracted Somali conflict is that,
they fail to appreciate the importance of informal networks
traditional clan leaders, business groups, Islamists,
and civil societies - and their creativity to achieve not
only stability, but competitive and efficient economy that
provide better services than the governments and the private
sectors of the neighboring states.
When the TFG was created in 2004, United States, European
Union, and other donor countries were not satisfied the competence
and the integrity of the leadership of the TFG, because the
process was not inclusive, and instead of being a national
reconciliation process for all the Somali stakeholders, it
became a narrow process for the warlords, their close associates,
and self appointed clan leaders. However, the International
community shifted their approach when the UIC - which has
been clan-based courts - ascended in to power, after three
month war, declared by the Mogadishu-based warlords, to stop
Somalia becoming a safe- heaven for terrorists.
The ascendancy
of the UIC as major political and military force and their
discipline, organizational skills, competence, efficiency
and the speed they have cried their activities have got the
attention of otherwise disinterested diplomats and policy
experts. However, after four months of junior level diplomatic
contact with UIC, the UN Security Council decided to support
TFG and considered the UIC as rouge element, and radical Islamists
who are threat to the stability in the region. As a result
Somalia became another front of the global war on terror.
Furthermore, Somalia's political conflict which has been a
local issue had become international, and more complicated
to find a coherent solution.
In conclusion,
the TFG has become the biggest obstacle to national reconciliation
and any prospect of achieving sustainable peace and creation
of government of national unity. The UN and other donor countries
must accept the fact that the incompetence of TFG is permanent
and imbedded in its genes, therefore, diplomatic recognition,
and financial support will not reverse that condition. I am
convinced that the new Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein is
man of integrity and he means what he says, but luck of political
progress towards reconciliation is eroding his momentum. On
the other hand The Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
(ARS) must change their warrior/rebel mentality to find a
sustainable solution to Somali suffering through initiating
realistic road map, and expend their political base by inviting
any one who is interested to end the chronic suffering of
our people. It is time for the ARS to change their tactics
and instead of focusing the Ethiopian invasion and arms resistance,
must explore a political solution that will bring together
various stake-holders, and simultaneously achieve the same
goal of ending Ethiopian invasion and the war crimes they
are committing daily, against unarmed civilians.
by Daud
Ed, daciid@gmail.com
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